racial discrimination combined to undermine black farmers at the local and state level. 7 Rural reform did not develop evenly across Texas ----evidence of the ways that local attitudes, geography, and demographics affected decisions. For example, just under 490,000 African Americans lived in the state in 1890, accounting for 21.5 percent of its total population, the smallest percentage among the eleven former Confederate states. Yet Texas ranked fourth in the nation in the number of farms operated by African American owners and tenants that same year. The black population did not decline, but white in--migration caused the black proportion to drop to only 17.7 percent in 1910 . Then Texas ranked thirteenth in the nation in the proportion of black compared to white residents. By 1940, black Texans accounted for only 14.4 percent of the state's total population (see Table 1 ). The African American population was concentrated in eighty--three counties in the eastern half of the state, a region equal to the area of either Alabama or Mississippi. People of African descent accounted for over 50 percent of the total population in only eight counties, 25 to 49.9 percent of the population in forty--two counties, and 12.5 to 24.9 percent in thirty--three others. Politicians and local officials in these rural counties reacted in the southern tradition: They generally condoned the intimidation and violence perpetrated by white supremacists against African Americans, and they supported Jim Crow legislation that legalized discrimination and disfranchisement. These efforts to control the black population succeeded only partially because many African Americans found employment in "Heavenly Houston" rather than in northern cities, and they helped subsidize their farming families. While many distanced themselves from southern racism, the most severe decline in Texas's rural black population did not coincide with the Great Migration of the 1910s, but rather with the post--World War II migration. Neither violence nor droughts, floods nor pests, forced a mass exodus. Rather, African Americans persisted in the rural countryside because they chose farming as their occupation. Rather than having it foisted upon them, they valued their rural society and culture and believed that government support could be secured, despite Jim Crow legislation.8Several factors affected the experiences of African American farmers in Texas, and some factors reduced the disadvantages that the minority farmers faced in securing and retaining land. The relatively late settlement of the state meant that the plantation economy and culture did not become as entrenched in Texas as it did in other southern states. Geography promoted a diversified system of plantation agriculture that blended stock farming with cotton production during the antebellum era. Even though Texas became the leading cotton--producing state by 1890, production dominated only the blackland prairie region during the 1910s and 1920s. Significantly, the blackland prairie included proportionately fewer African American farm operators than other East Texas counties. The westward movement of cotton out of the Old South and into East Texas, combined with abundant land and relatively large African American populations in East Texas, made it possible for some African American farmers to raise cotton without total domination by white planters. Further, the racial composition of the Texas countryside, including whites and African Americans as well as Mexicans and Mexican Americans, created different racial tensions than those that existed in other parts of the South. This caused white Texans in some parts of the state to favor African Americans as farm operators. In combination, these factors created a more stable landowning class of black farmers.9 Disparity existed as some farmers capitalized on their resources. They mechanized, commercialized production, and affected policy decisions that increased subsidies for farmers. Most studies stress the ways that the abandonment of labor intensive agriculture displaced poor white and black farmers and agricultural laborers. New Deal programs exacerbated the inequities of southern agriculture and hastened outmigration. But, an elite group of black landlords, a rural talented tenth, emerged who depended on tenant and sharecroppers for year--round labor, developed and sustained black communities as important processing and marketing points for their agricultural commodities, consolidated land, bought machinery and improved stock, and exercised limited political influence. In contrast to these progressive black farmers, small--scale minority farmers depended on their families for labor, as did their white peers. They focused their energies on raising cotton, the cash crop that drove East Texas agriculture until the Great Depression, but could not do so on a scale that gave them any market leverage. Finally, they expended their energies on supporting community institutions, such as churches and schools, rather than engaging in capital intensive agriculture characterized by land acquisition, mechanization, and market--oriented production.10 These minority farmers shared the liabilities of small--scale farming with their white peers. Many small farmers owned land with low valuations, which limited their ability to capitalize on their operations. Therefore the small--scale farmer, regardless of race, chose not to invest in new equipment, use commercial fertilizers, or increase yields with new varieties and cultivation techniques, all of which amounted to visible proof of "progress" in the opinions of commercial farmers and reformers. And, in decisions that were critical for their future, small--scale farmers often inherited family farms but did not secure clear title to the farm land, and in turn, they did not will it to a single heir. Instead they expected the property to remain in common family ownership. Also, agricultural reformers such as extension agents and policymakers considered the diversified approach to farming that small producers practiced as obsolete. White farmers, however, had a distinct advantage over black farmers: they fit within the majority culture of Texas. African American farmers existed outside this majority culture despite the goals and concerns they shared with their white peers.11 African American farmers faced additional challenges because of their race. They had been lobbying for the right to participate in government educational offerings since the late nineteenth century, but momentum increased after 1903 when Cooperative Demonstration Work began in Texas. The work originated in response to the boll weevil infestation that moved into Texas from Mexico in 1894, and then spread to the rest of the cotton--growing South. Yet the slowness with which government officials offered services to black farmers, just as debilitated by the weevil as white farmers in Texas, indicates the bias of government programs against minority farmers. While farmers in other parts of the South may have abandoned depleted fields after the onslaught of the weevil, Texans benefited from the westward migration of the cotton crop, and they increased demands for services. Finally, in 1914, the Smith--Lever Act authorized federal appropriations to states to improve agriculture and rural life throughout the nation. Administrators at the Texas Agricultural Extension Service (TAEX), only after receiving assurance that they would control federal monies allotted for extension work in the state, started the "Negro division" in 1915 to serve African American farmers.12 Segregation provided information and advice that both helped and hurt rural African Americans. Officials who wanted to stern the outmigration of rural black southerners that exploded during the late 1910s believed that extension services could accomplish that, but only some African American farmers qualified for the attention. Across the South, black extension agents targeted landowners, those who deserved the services of the federal and state governments and could best implement the advice. This gave black landowning farmers who chose to participate the latest information on scientific agriculture, soil conservation, livestock care, and management strategies. Yet it left outside the information loop many owners as well as most tenants, sharecroppers, and agricultural laborers. Only the few African Americans who participated received any benefits. Black agents also relayed a contradictory message to many clients. They promoted diversification, a rational step toward economic stability that could sustain small--scale, undercapitalized farmers. But the strategy also constrained black farmers because it discouraged many from investing their limited resources in riskier commercial agriculture. Thus, diversification isolated many minority farmers from extension programs directed toward commercial farmers, mostly white, and served by white agents. 13 The African American agents of state and federal government, caught between the black farmers seeking support and the white governments seeking compliance, contributed to the problem. Some agents in Texas, all of whom had vocational or college training in agriculture or home economies, came from other southern states and alienated some farmers who could not accept advice from outsiders. To counter the obstacles, many agents proved innovative in their programs and involved farm families in program planning and delivery, thus ensuring the participation of greater numbers of rural African Americans. Yet because the agents were expected to document "progress" to their superiors, they directed their energies toward farm families who had a chance of succeeding. Furthermore, African American agents accepted subordinate positions in a segregated agency, funded by federal monies but administered by Texas authorities. They worked out of the Prairie View Normal and Industrial College (now Prairie View A&M University), a traditionally black land--grant institution. White legislators and TAEX administrators never gave the black agents everything they wanted; yet despite their marginalized and under--funded positions, they built a bureaucracy that affected white opinion. The positions and influence that the agents attained became as precious to some as the services they had been hired to provide to black farmers. By 1924, the TAEX's Negro division received more federal money than did the segregated divisions in any other southern state and employed as many or more employees. The agents effectively lobbied white Texans to continue services even as segregated services in other southern states lost public support. The agents' minority status, however, prevented them from changing the extension services' preference for commercial agriculture or from defeating pernicious racism.14 African Americans debated the economic solutions open to them given the limitations imposed on them by disfranchisement. Farmers and agents disagreed over the best actions to take because they approached the problems from different perspectives the farmers as entrepreneurs, who wanted to prosper, compared to the agents of the state, who wanted to sustain their bureaucracy and keep blacks on the farm. Black agents believed that "the Negro is naturally a farmer, that he can best serve society and be the happiest on the farm, and that farm ownership makes for good citizenship." The majority of rural blacks did not own land, however, but this did not affect their decision to farm. Most worked for wages or a share of the crop from the 1910s to the 1930s, a period when fluctuating commodity prices and high inflation rates hurt owners and tenants alike. During the crisis of the 1930s, extension agents responded to financial woes by intensifying their advice to diversify production and invest limited resources in land. Agents argued that diversification provided a means to break out of the cycle of landlord dependency and debt. Tenant contracts prohibited diversification but bound farmers to grow cotton or corn, the crops that most benefited the landlord. Tenants also chose different capital investments than land. By buying draft animals, equipment, or automobiles, they could rent more land, raise more cotton, and become more involved in the market. Tenants who had the resources often chose not to pay the asking price for over--valued land nor invest in substandard but inexpensive land. Most African Americans lived in areas with some of the lowest land values in the state. In 1930, acreage in parts of East Texas, where many blacks lived, was assessed at figures comparable to that in the arid west; counties such as Tyler averaging $5.69 per acre. Six of the eight counties where African Americans constituted more than 50 percent of the population had land values of less than ten dollars per acre. Tenants chose not to invest in land with such low values and low potential. Yet according to the state agents, frugality and hard work should lead to land ownership. To them, the tenants' decisions made no sense or represented a waste of limited resources.15 Evidence supported the agents' claim that landownership provided security. In 1930, nearly 64 percent of black owners had operated their farms for more than ten years compared to 79.5 percent of black tenants, who had operated their leases for four years or less ( Table 2 ). Most African American extension agents directed their services toward the owner--operators because they had a proven track record based partially on their permanent residence on a farm they owned. Landowning blacks paid county taxes, and their opinions mattered to county commissioners, who responded to their requests for local funding to secure the services of black agents. As a result, agents worked in many but not all of the counties where black landowning farmers accounted for 40 to 60 percent of the total number of landowning farmers, and in more than half of all counties where black landowning farmers accounted for 20 to 40 percent of all landowning farmers ( Figure 1 ). This indicates the limited but real leverage that black farmers and bureaucrats wielded in Texas. 16 Landownership gave farmers of both races freedom of choice that tenants and sharecroppers did not enjoy. Landowners could plant the crops they wanted in the quantities they wanted. Yet most farmers in Texas concentrated on cotton, the crop that could quickly generate revenue for them to expand their operations or improve their material comfort. African American agents cautioned against depending on such an unstable market crop because it jeopardized the farmers' operations. Breaking the all--cotton habit, however, proved beyond the power of the extension agents, even though they made concerted efforts. The 1930 census counted 85,940 black farm operators (including full and part owners), tenants, and managers, the peak for black farm operations in Texas. African Americans operated 17.4 percent of all farms in the state. That year the cotton crop in Texas broke all previous records with 3,793,392 bales produced. In 1930, the glutted cotton market collapsed, and government regulation of agricultural production gained momentum. Thereafter the flight from the land began in earnest. 17 The economic depression that gripped the United States throughout the 1930s hurt Texas farmers regardless of race. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal promised economic relief, but the aid failed to live up to its potential because racial discrimination affected decisions. New Deal administrators who excluded African Americans from planning and administration included black extension agents only in implementation. White Texans expected the black agents, both male and female, to provide information about the New Deal programs to their constituents. The agents' sponsorship made it possible for those blacks involved with the extension service to realize some benefits, but it did little for those who chose not to participate or who lived in counties where white authority figures did not support county agents. The black agents insured themselves against failure by channeling aid to farmers with proven track records, and they increased their visibility by accepting appointments to advisory groups. Each new role that the black agents assumed ----each farm that they helped an operator improve, each tenant that they convinced to stay on the land ----represented a small victory. This helped some farmers, but more important for the extension agents, it gave them an opportunity to bolster the reputation of the segregated service and create a niche for themselves within the largest public welfare program undertaken in the United States to date. The strategy, however, did not help poorer farmers in the least, and it hastened African American flight from rural Texas.18 One New Deal agency, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), urged farmers to reduce production to stabilize prices. Because crops were already in the fields in Summer 1933 when the agency initiated reduction programs, federal officials launched a series of plow--up campaigns. The major southern plow--up concentrated on cotton, and government officials had to convince farmers in Texas, the leading cotton producing state, to participate to ensure the program's success. TAEX officials knew that they needed the help of black extension agents to implement the program because African American farmers learned about such programs only through the black agents. John Lusk, the African American agent in Washington County, reported that he worked with the white agricultural agent to interest at least 500 farmers in the reduction program, or 31.8 percent of black farmers in the county. The public meetings that Lusk called included a countywide gathering on 30 June in the district court room in Brenham. The black agent in Gregg County, R. G. Johnson, spent less time on the emergency work, only five days, but he reportedly conducted 185 meetings, responded to 75 office visits from interested farmers, and helped 252 farmers apply and secure the production reduction contracts. Given this level of participation, Johnson reached at least 20.7 percent of the black farm operators in the county, and they plowed up 1,242 acres of cotton.19 Source: Negroes in the United States, 1920--32, 813--27, County Personnel, box 13, 14, and 15, TAEX Historical Files. A total of twenty--three black county agents in Texas worked on the campaign in 1933. They met with 14,680 families, 17 percent of the black farm operators in the state, in an attempt to convince them to participate. These farmers plowed up 187,323 acres, but this amounted to only 4.3 percent of the 4,350,565 acres that Texans ultimately destroyed. This percentage indicates the small amount of Texas farmland that black farmers controlled, and concomitantly, the AAA's bias against black farmers. Furthermore, black farm operators received only $835,529, or 2.1 percent, of the $39,225,000 paid in cotton acreage reduction contracts to Texas farmers. This indicates the disparity in the 1933 AAA payment structure that privileged landlords over plow--up enrollees. The 1934 and 1935 AAA payment structures made the problem even worse.20 Despite the inequities in the government program, many minority agents of the state found more to praise than to fault in the campaign. According to one home demonstration agent, AAA did what the agents could not do: it freed farm families from the burden of an "all cotton" crop. In 1939, Lea Etta Lusk wrote that "now since each farm can plant only a limited amount of cotton, the families are farming on a more scientific basis. They are planting more legumes and cover crops producing more cotton with less expense, which means a saving in feed, labor, and implements. The land released from cotton has given them a chance to plant a larger acreage in food for the family, and feed for the stock, as a result we have better filled pantries and barns, producing more joy and contentment." Agents continued to advocate material improvements as acreage went out of cotton production. Lusk noted that most families used the "Conservation parity checks" for home improvement. The agricultural agent in Walker County, K. H. Malone, reported that farmers used their "increased earnings" to buy farm equipment and land, improve their homes, and pay back taxes and notes. AAA may have helped some farmers, but it left the majority totally unserved. 21 The laudatory reports that agents and their supervisors filed deceived readers, masking the real crisis that transformed the countryside during the Great Depression. The rate of mechanization increased during the 1930s, making year--round tenants obsolete. Farmers turned to migrant laborers to work during the chopping and harvest seasons; tenants and sharecroppers were hard pressed to find enough work to remain in agriculture. Unfair distribution of cotton plow--up payments exacerbated the cash shortfall and small farmers, black and white alike, got no justice through the appeals process. All complaints went to county committees composed of white landlords or their sympathizers. When asked why tenants and sharecroppers did not sit on the committee, a county agent quipped, "Hell! You wouldn't put a chicken on a poultry board, would you?" Many farmers remained silent rather than criticize landlords or government officials because they knew that the county committees would rule against them and possibly retaliate. Others, however, shared their dissatisfaction with federal representatives. Tenants and croppers of Mexican as well as African ancestry who worked in the plantation region of the Brazos River Valley during 1933 complained so persistently that the special AAA inspector in Texas, A. A. Allison, urged Cully A. Cobb, director of the AAA Cotton Section, to do "something" to get cotton benefits to them. Residents of Fort Bend, a gulf coastal county, benefited from all--black self--help initiatives, such as the Farmers' Improvement Society of Texas, as well as the services of black extension agents. Fort Bend sharecroppers wrote to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace and asked for the federal government to intervene. They refused to sign their names, however, because "they [the landowners] are hard on us about writing Washington, D.C." Cedar A. Walton, the black agricultural agent in Dallas County, testified before the Farm Tenancy Committee in 1937 that black sharecroppers had no support in that north--central Texas county. The bureaucracy offered no resolution; the national government vested decisions in local white control. Economic hardship, the complicity between the federal government and local officials who impeded justice, and a healthy distrust of educated agents of the government who refused to get their hands dirty, caused many white and black farmers to leave the land in disgust.22
Obviously, the government programs placed small--scale, non--landowning farmers in an even more precarious position than landowners. Of all farm operators in Texas in 1930, only 4.2 percent were blacks who owned their land; 13.2 percent were black tenants. By 1935, the percentage of owners remained steady, but the number of tenants had dropped to 10.2 percent, an indication that land ownership provided some stability. These few black farmers controlled a minuscule amount of Texas acreage. In 1930, blacks accounted for 17.4 percent of farmers but operated only 3.7 percent of the farmland. By 1935, black operators had dropped to 14.3 percent of the total in the state, and they farmed only 2.8 percent of the land. By 1940, the number of black owners had increased, and they and the tenants who remained had enlarged the size of their holdings (Table 3 ). Yet white landlords controlled not only the remaining 97.2 percent of Texas land, but also much of the land that black tenants farmed. The small farms that African Americans cultivated, their involvement with tenancy, the racism that limited their political involvement, and county agents' concentration on the landed, all conspired against the majority of black farm operators. The government subsidies failed to change these pernicious characteristics of southern agriculture.23 SOURCE: Negro Farmers in the United States, 27, 30, 39, 43, 50--55, 79 ; Negroes in the United States, 1920 States, --1932 Other New Deal programs besides AAA provided assistance to black farmers, who needed credit just as much as white farmers. Limited collateral made it difficult for poor farmers of either race to secure loans, and inflation made a loan through a lending agency almost as risky as a traditional crop lien. The Farm Credit Act created the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) to reform farm credit. All federal agencies extending credit to farmers consolidated under FCA, including Federal Land Banks, Intermediate Credit Banks, and Crop Production Offices operated by the USDA. Since 1929, the latter had offered seed loans to black farmers, who had maintained excellent repayment records. Seed loans remained a popular item for farmers even as AAA attempted to reduce crop production. Black agents who helped farmers apply for these loans and plan repayment reminded them not to become dependent. Nevertheless, relief programs that offered loans appealed to African Americans who needed to refinance mortgages, and agents succumbed to their wishes and sponsored their applications. The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 helped at least four farmers in McLennan County. The Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933 also channeled aid toward black farmers. 24 The idea of a special credit bureau for African Americans did not gain support from the USDA in 1933 because Secretary of Agriculture Wallace believed that agricultural credit rested with the FCA. Nevertheless, black farmers continued to request consideration. The Texas "Negro" extension service supervisors discussed this at a staff meeting in 1937, recommending "the establishment of a Credit Rating for farm people as well as agents in their respective counties." The FCA targeted black extension agents as a means to reach more farmers and reduce the number who lost their farms due to foreclosure, believing this approach could also serve to reduce the incidents of unfair treatment based on race. The FCA representative King told black supervisors to have farmers write him directly and to provide details. 25 The Bankhead--Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937 offered another opportunity to small--scale African American farmers, but it never realized its potential because so few loans reached the needy. Intending to alleviate rural poverty, the act made rehabilitation loans available for farmers to ward off land loss and for tenants to buy land. The Farm Security Administration (FSA) oversaw Bankhead--Jones funds. The New Deal agency employed a black advisor, Joseph H. B. Evans, a specialist in race relations, as well as black personnel to work with resettlement projects. By 1938, approximately 21 percent of all families approved for FSA loans were black. Yet from the start of the allocations in 1937 until 30 June 1940, only 162 black families in Texas received these loans, and they averaged smaller loans than white families: blacks $606, whites $659. Also, FSA favored those with the greatest potential for rehabilitation. Detailed enrollment forms helped officials screen applicants; only those with good credit histories and personal commitment qualified. 26 As with other USDA programs, local and state committees distributed the funding and services. Calvin Waller, the state leader of the segregated TAEX division, chaired the FSA "Committee for Negroes" in Texas, thus ensuring the involvement of county and home demonstration agents in referring satisfactory clients for the resettlement projects. Regular staff meetings at Prairie View A&M facilitated this arrangement. Henry Estelle, a Negro district agent, reported to Negro extension supervisory staff about the counties the FSA planned to use to settle tenants and the process by which Negro clients would be selected. The district agents then relayed the information to the "colored" agents in their respective areas. The farmers that agents recommended were usually admitted into the projects. 27 The limited relief available through New Deal programs did not satisfy the desperate need of most rural African Americans and generally thwarted those with the greatest need. Three things exacerbated the inequity. First of all, the federal government did not provide enough resources to satisfy demand. Secondly, the administrators directed the aid toward handpicked recipients, not the neediest. Finally, the administrative structure channeled information on relief and recover programs through the state extension offices, and representatives affiliated with those offices made the selections. As a result, farmers and their families with a history of extension involvement gained an advantage in the application and selection process. This eventually trickled down to those African Americans involved in the extension service, but it left most rural blacks out of the loop. Many owners, tenants, and sharecroppers could not secure loans because they had no history of involvement with the extension program and failed to make the grade. The same applied to poor whites. The welfare state discriminated on the basis of race and class, thus "deserving" African Americans were under--served compared to their deserving white peers, and those deemed undeserving lost out entirely. The staff of the segregated TAEX took advantage of the prestige they gained through their involvement in New Deal programs to sustain the program throughout World War II and the Cold War. Those served by the extension remained a rather exclusive group. Only about 7.7 percent of the rural black population regularly paid dues to extension clubs, home demonstration, or 4--H clubs and participated in official extension activities. But the service became more inclusive during the late 1930s as the agents advertised meetings and expanded offerings to appeal to general audiences. By 1940, agents reported that they reached nearly 42 percent of all black Texans through their work with soup kitchens, curbside markets, and county health campaigns ----meaningful programs not threatening to the status quo. Nevertheless, black administrators used the statistics to increase public recognition of their service and strengthen their bureaucracy.28
Between 1941 and 1945, the agency grew as a result of wartime funding, but allocations proved inadequate. Although Texas added fifteen African American county extension workers to the payrolls, seven counties ceased to host agents. By 1946, 108 agents (56 men and 52 women) worked in at least 56 counties assisting residents in planning and implementing better farming practices and methods to improve rural life. Only Mississippi employed more agents (110), and only North Carolina received more total funds than Texas to support extension work for African American farmers. The support provided to the Texas extension was disproportionately large compared to the number of black farmers in the state, yet still inadequate to respond to the needs of farm operators. In 1940, Mississippi had the highest proportion of black to white farmers in the nation (64 percent); North Carolina ranked fifth (35 percent) , and Texas ranked seventh (17.1 percent) . By 1950, the decreasing proportion of black farmers indicated the extent of outmigration. Mississippi remained first (53.7 percent), North Carolina had moved to second (28.3 percent) , and Texas remained seventh in the nation (11 percent). The funding secured by black extension agents in Texas sustained the bureaucracy and channeled service to the farmers who participated.29 Agents concentrated on improving stock and furthering patriotic endeavors during the war. Sears, Roebuck and Company, located in Dallas, assisted stock improvement goals by providing purebred pigs, chicks, and heifers to club members either selected by county agents or judges at stock shows. The poverty of East Texas counties made it difficult for members there to participate, even though Sears gave away pigs. Agents persevered, however, and by 1946, the Sears Cow--Hog--Hen Program extended to Houston, Newton, Harrison, Rusk, and Smith counties in East Texas. 30 The improvement of breeds aided national initiatives such as victory drives and the Farm Labor Program; the extension service helped establish the programs. Eugenia Adeline Woods, previously a home demonstration agent in Walker, Milam, and Montgomery counties, served as (state emergency) food specialist at Prairie View from May 1943 to November 1945. She and other African American district agents and administrators presented radio broadcasts to encourage African Americans to "save and share." Other African American agents received emergency food assistant appointments and along with county agents encouraged residents in fifty--one counties to increase production for the patriotic cause. Others worked to reduce labor shortages caused by war industries and the draft. Two TAEX staff members received appointments to the federal Farm Labor Program. Included were William Cullen David, previously an extension agent in Madison County and district agent, who became "Negro" state farm labor leader, and John Vinson Smith, previously an agent in McLennan County, who became the assistant state labor leader. The staff appointed to war--related positions within extension remained TAEX employees after the war. They had gained valuable experience, which they applied in their leadership roles after their special service ended. Their dedication helped the "Negro" extension service division in Texas to survive the post--war years. 31 The relative success of these black extension agents during the post--World War II years belies the problems that assailed rural African Americans in Texas after World War II, causing them to leave their farms in droves. The rural black population declined by 41.3 percent, from 504,281 in 1940 to 296,250 in 1960 (Table 1) , and the number of black farm owners declined even more rapidly, by 71.6 percent, from 52,725 in 1940 to 14,994 in 1960. The steepest decline occurred between 1950 and 1960 when 20,000 left farming ----a 56.3 percent decline over the decade. African Americans fled tenancy and sharecropping fastest between 1940 (32,610 farmers) and 1960 (3, 138) , when their numbers declined by 92.4 percent. Only 628 African Americans remained tenants in Texas in 1970.32 As the number of rural Texans declined, the segregated service had to adjust its programming to reach new audiences. The Cold War gave the TAEX a much--needed boost by providing an opportunity for agents of both races to promote patriotism, rural economic development, and civil defense. The "Negro" extension service division strengthened services to urban residents as well, responding to the demographic shift in the African American population. This sustained the growth of the extension service into the 1960s. One of the initiatives involved including the general public in program planning, facilitated by meetings in public places such as courthouses and schools. Extension agents also involved veterans in vocational education in the interest of stemming the outmigration. The most active training occurred in counties with strong extension programs; black agents helped connect veterans to vocational instructors, much as black agents interested farmers in AAA programs during the New Deal era.33 As African American extension agents worked within Texas counties to sustain programs despite rapid declines in the number of black farm operators, African Americans kept policymakers at the national level attentive to issues of racism. By 1941, black educators and writers demanded the integration of the USDA. The criticism prompted action, and Claude A. Barnett, director of the Associated Negro Press, and Dr. F. D. Patterson, president of Tuskegee Institute, received appointments as special assistants to the Secretary of Agriculture in fall 1942. The appointments, however, did not reverse discriminatory practices. The Associated Negro Press proved influential in lobbying efforts, with Barnett taking a leadership role. He urged W. C. David, the Texas Negro division leader, and other black extension service leaders to provide him with information on the agricultural situation in their state. Barnett intended for African American presses to use the information to keep the Secretary of Agriculture, C. F. Brannan (1948 Brannan ( --1953 , informed about "our principal needs and most urgent problems." Barnett described Brannan as having "a fine and constructive interest in Negro farmers." The pressure kept the USDA from forgetting about rural African Americans. In addition to funding conferences to discuss issues, federal extension officials integrated the staff. They promoted John W. Mitchell, a regional USDA field agent, to the position of "national leader" in September 1953. He became the "first colored Extension worker" to receive such an appointment. The job change required Mitchell to move from his headquarters at Hampton Institute, Virginia to the USDA offices in Washington, D.C., where he could more effectively counsel federal extension staff on ways to "develop and strengthen the work with Negro farm families and 4--H club youths." Yet these highly visible public relations moves and durable funding to the segregated division did not reduce the incidents of discrimination that most black farmers encountered daily.34 By 1964, the segregated TAEX employed 104 professional staff members working in sixty counties. This staffing nearly equaled the 1946 level (108 agents in fifty--six counties). Obviously the bureaucracy did not experience an outmigration comparable to that of the black farmers. On 2 July 1964, Texan and President Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act. It required all federally assisted programs to eliminate discrimination, and it prohibited job discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, or sex. The equality promised by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, failed to trickle down to the Negro division of the TAEX in a timely manner. In fact, the act worked against the black extension agents because TAEX officials used the legislation to eliminate, rather than strengthen, services to African Americans. The transition year began with the death of the Negro division's state leader, Marshall V Brown, on 22 January 1964. TAEX officials never filled the position. Instead they manipulated titles to protect the status of white agents in the face of pending civil rights legislation. As a result, "Negro" agents became "associate" agents. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, issued on 11 December 1964, forced TAEX officials to take further action. They developed a single line of administration by eliminating the Negro division entirely and absorbing agents from the division's three districts into several TAEX districts. They left the associate district agents stationed at Prairie View A&M and did not integrate the TAEX headquarters at Texas A&M University, justifying the decision by citing examples of white agents and supervisors who worked out of district offices.35 Southern extension service directors generally believed that African American agents would not jeopardize their positions to protest the actions. They learned, however, that some agents had reached the limits of accommodation. John E. Hutchison, TAEX director, underestimated the opposition. He acknowledged that "some few . . . might try to encourage certain radical groups to put pressure on the Extension Service and Texas A&M University to be publicly critical of many programs which might be interpreted as being possibly discriminatory against Negro participants." In reality, black agents did not readily accept the separate offices, subordinate titles, and lower pay and benefits. Preston E. Poole, agricultural agent in Galveston County, Texas, was dissatisfied with TAEX responses to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and challenged the federal Extension Service (ES) to reinterpret the relationship between federal--state--county authorities. Poole believed that the federal government should require local officials to extend equal pay and office space and require Texas officials to enforce the spirit of the act. 36 The USDA officials condoned discrimination in Texas' extension service and refused to interfere with the TAEX decision--making and implementation process. In fact, they did little more than field complaints from agents about continued segregation and discrimination. Lloyd Davis, the ES administrator, justified the decisions to ignore black agents' requests for mediation for humanitarian reasons. Davis claimed that swift federal enforcement of the integration law would lead to the firing of black agents who were funded partially by local appropriations and housed in offices secured by county governing boards. Even though the USDA created an administrative position to assist the secretary with civil rights compliance in 1965, the wheels turned slowly; many agents (including Poole) did not resolve claims until the early 1970s. This reduced African American access to government information and programs because it created unstable working conditions that lasted until 1972 when most southern states finally integrated their extension headquarters. African Americans criticized the decisions.37 Even efforts to correct generations of inequity backfired. During the 1960s, the federal government documented the unfamiliarity of most black producers with government farm programs. The reports supported new policies to address racial exclusion, often by creating separately funded programs to serve economically disadvantaged and ethnically diverse populations. Yet a belief that the problems of racial inequality had been solved led to perpetual under--funding and ineffective implementation of special needs legislation. This contributed to a new wave of outmigration during the late 1960s and 1970s that crippled remaining black farmers. 38 As the officials at TAEX and ES headquarters contemplated integration, a talented young African American from southeastern Texas gained the experience and education he needed to integrate the service and provide needed programs. Dempsey Seastrunk began as a Jasper County agricultural agent in 1948; he was transferred to Prairie View A&M to work as a farm and home development specialist in 1959, and continued in that position until 1972. He entered the Ph.D. program in cooperative extension administration at the University of Wisconsin--Madison in summer 1964, and after he completed coursework in 1967, TAEX officials gave Seastrunk an office at TAEX headquarters in College Station. His thoughtful approach to involving marginal income farmers fit the growing interest in special services for under--served audiences and proved popular with TAEX and farmers alike. After he completed his dissertation in 1972, TAEX officials appointed him to the position of assistant director for special programs, operating out of the College Station headquarters. In this capacity, Seastrunk implemented a new program designed to improve the income position of small farmers. The Agricultural Act of 1971 (Public Law 92--73) codified this new offering. The act vested Prairie View A&M and 1890 land--grant institutions throughout the South with full authority for the new "Small Farm Program." Autonomous extension programs were thereby created to serve economically disadvantaged and ethnically diverse populations throughout the South separate from the bureaucracies at white land--grant colleges.39 On 1 April 1972, TAEX selected an extension agent, Hoover Carden, trained at Prairie View University, to administer the new project. He served for 23 years. Previously Carden had worked with black farmers in Marion County, creating some concern on the part of TAEX officials and white participants because he motivated farm youth and integrated 4--H shows at the state level. Special needs legislation made it possible to promote him to a position administering an autonomous program, but one effectively segregated from the resources that TAEX possessed. The Cooperative Extension Program at Prairie View A&M University received additional support on 29 September 1977, when the Cooperative Extension Work Act was passed. The federal legislation increased funding to 1890s institutions through the USDA and the federal extension program. Thereafter, these programs became the 1890 Cooperative Extension Program. They served low--income rural and urban African Americans and other ethnic groups but did not discriminate on the basis of socioeconomic level, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, or handicap. Some black agents found positions within the 1890 program, while others worked out of TAEX headquarters on the Texas A&M campus at College Station. As black agents retired from TAEX, white agents generally replaced them.40 African American farmers did not find their needs served by the new program, and the decline in the number of black agents working for the "integrated" TAEX operating out of College Station made many leery of seeking advice and assistance from white agents. Frustrated by the hesitancy to provide equal resources, experienced county extension agents took further action. Eight years after his initial complaint, Preston E. Poole, the Galveston County agent, launched a class action suit that charged TAEX with discrimination in employment. Poole believed that two groups of people suffered because of chronic discrimination: the black employees of TAEX and "those blacks who receive[d] the services provided . . . to the agricultural community." The resulting consent decree satisfied the complaints of the first group, the black employees, because TAEX voluntarily adjusted its pay scale to reflect merit and service, not race. The interests of the second group, African Americans seeking the services of TAEX, did not affect the decree and remained unaddressed.41 But some African Americans managed to hold onto their farms despite the preferential treatment afforded to white farmers. The inequities not resolved in Poole v. Williams continued, and eventually more southern black farmers charged the USDA with discrimination documented between 1981 and 1996. The case of Pigford v. Glickman was settled by consent decree in January 2001. The USDA agreed to offer restitution to African American farmers who proved that the agency did not respond to their applications for loans and other services on the basis of race. The Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund and other black farm support organizations have criticized the government, however, for delayed decision--making regarding claims and denying nearly 40 percent of the claims. Finally, the Associated Press released a series on black land loss in December 2001 that acquainted a larger audience with the inequities. Black farmers could claim chronic discrimination perpetrated by the USDA since the department's founding in 1862. Their efforts thus far have prevented the extinction of black farms, but the legacy of self--help goals provided loopholes that made it possible for discrimination to continue through special legislation. As a result, black farmers struggle to gain equitable services to sustain their livelihood and preserve their way of life. 42 The effect of the Pigford decision is not yet known. Imtially, black farmers and activists considered it a major challenge to institutionalized racism. Yet, the offered settlements have left them frustrated and critical of the government's compliance. Some minority farmers in Texas, however, have managed to persevere throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, the number of full and part owners and tenants increased modestly in number but significantly in proportion, from 3,292 in 1982, 10.5 percent of all black--operated farms in fifteen southern states, to 3,462 in 1997, 20 .2 percent of the southern total. This increase in numbers in one state combined with the legal recognition of discriminatory practices, the viability of less intensive capitalized farming, and laws that safeguard their property may stabilize the interests of African Americans in the countryside.43 FOOTNOTES
